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RECENT DECISIONS
this may fairly and properly be done no part of the language
used can be superfluous or unmeaning.0
Applying this reasoning to the contract, one might well ask why the
scrivener used the word applicable when he meant payable. If applicable
is to have a meaning of its own, it cannot mean the same thing as
payable.
It may be concluded that Wisconsin would not reach the result of
the Virginia case that a motorist who is insured, but whose carrier has
become insolvent, is uninsured. The uninsured motorist provision of
the standard contract does not on its face provide for such a result.
Since the language is not ambiguous, there is no room for the applica-
tion of the rule that a contract of insurance must be construed against
the insurer. MARY C. CAHILL
Judgments: Mutuality as an Element of Collateral Estoppel:
Zdanok v. Glidden Co." and its companion case, Alexander v. Glidden
Co.'. both arose out of a collective-bargaining agreement between de-
fendant and a local of the General Warehousemen's Union which rep-
resented employees at defendant's food processing plant in Elmhurst,
New York. After the contract had expired, defendant moved its plant
to Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.
Zdanok and four other former Elmhurst employeese brought an
action in the Supreme Court of New York for New York County,
which was removed by the defendant Glidden on the basis of diversity
of citizenship to the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. There, judgment was had against the plaintiffs on
the merits. On appeal, the Second Circuit construed the contract as
entitling plaintiffs to be employed at the defendant's Bethlehem plant,
retaining seniority and reemployment rights acquired at the Elmhurst
plant, and remanded the case to the district court for determination
of plaintiffs' damages.
Alexander and a large number of other Elmhurst employees 4 com-
menced an action in the same federal district court substantially identi-
cal in issue with the Zdanok case. The two actions (Zdanok and Alex-
ander) were consolidated for trial.
Defendant attempted, in the Alexander case, to offer evidence re-
lating to the intent of the parties in negotiating the contract, seeking
a "de novo" construction for purposes of that case. Although admit-
9 Id. at 333.
1327 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
2 Ibid.
3 These were the plaintiffs in the original action, Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 216
F. Supp. 476 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
4These plaintiffs joined with the original action on remand to the district
court, Alexander v. Glidden Co., 216 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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ting the evidence, the district court deemed itself bound by the court of
appeals' interpretation of the contract. Defendant appealed, strongly in-
sisting that the interpretation of the contract in the prior decision should
not govern in light of the new evidence. The court of appeals held that
defendant's contractual liability had been litigated as fully as the parties
wished, and therefore defendant was estopped from asserting new evi-
dence on this question. The Alexander employees, although not parties
to the original action, had expected their rights to be governed by the
court's interpretation of the contract in the Zdanok action.
The court recognized that
... such a holding would have seemed impossible fifty years ago:
If in the Zdanok action the contract were construed as Glidden
contends, this would not preclude the Alexander plaintiffs from
offering extrinsic evidence to support their construction of the
contract, since they had not had their day in court. Because it
was thought that estoppels must be "mutual" . . . Glidden would
likewise not be precluded from offering new evidence against the
Alexander group.5
But the need for the mutuality of estoppel has been much eroded in
recent years.
Collateral estoppel is basically a device for preventing a party who
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate certain issues in a prior
action from relitigating the same issues in a later trial. It differs from
res judicata in that its estopping effect does not ordinarily or necessarily
reach the ultimate question of liability or nonliability, but is limited to
separable issues of fact previously litigated. The "offensive" use of the
doctrine is distinguished from its "defensive" use simply by the fact
that, in the former case, the estoppel is asserted either to dispense with
proof of an element of a claim, or in bar to a defense to a claim; where-
as, in the latter case, the doctrine is used to defeat a claim.6
In 1913, a judgment was held to be conclusive evidence between the
same parties in a subsequent suit involving any controverted point upon
the determination of which the earlier verdict was rendered, even
though the form of the second action was different.7 This basic theory
of estoppel by judgment was based on an 1876 case," where a basic
distinction was drawn between the effect of a judgment as estoppel
against the prosecution of a second action on the same claim and its
effect in a later action between the same parties on a different claim.
If the former, the judgment was conclusive as to every ground of
recovery actually presented or which might have been presented. If the
5 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., supra note 1, at 954.
6 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment a at 294-95 (1942).
7Tudor v. Kennett, 87 Vt. 99, 88 Atl. 520 (1913); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 68 (1942).
8 Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 68, comments c and d at 296-301 (1942).
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latter, it was conclusive only as to matters in issue or points actually
controverted.
By 1918, the doctrine was further extended so as to estop not only
parties to the original action, but also those in privity with the original
parties. The theory was that the closeness of the privity afforded full
opportunity to litigate the matter on the first trial.9 However, until 1940,
some courts continued to hold that the plea was available only if the
estoppel was technically mutual; i.e., when the party seeking to utilize
the plea would himself have been estopped had the prior judgment been
returned against him.10
Meanwhile, occasional decisions found limited exceptions to the
doctrine of mutuality. Thus, in a 1937 case," where the liability of the
defendant was found to be altogether dependent on the culpability of
a defendant exonerated in a prior suit on the same facts, the exoneration
was conclusive against the same plaintiff in the subsequent action. In
this instance, the party against whom the plea of estoppel was raised was
a party to the prior action, and therefore had a full opportunity to
litigate the issue of the defendant's responsibility. This same exception
was recognized in the 1940 case'2 mentioned above, but that court
pointed out that this exception does not apply where the defendant in a
subsequent action lost as plaintiff in the original action and later a new
party, even though in privity to the original defendant, asserts the plea
of estoppel. A strong dissent there suggested a more liberal rule that
where identical issues of liability upon a given set of facts
are put at issue in two successive suits, and where a full and
complete trial of those issues has been had and there are no cir-
cumstances of record in the second suit which might reasonably
justify a court in reaching a result contrary to the prior decision,
estoppel by judgment becomes applicable provided the one against
whom the prior judgment is invoked was a party to-at least a
plaintiff-in the prior action.' 3
The most significant liberalization of the doctrine of mutuality came
in a 1942 case'14 which not only adopted the earlier dissenting view, but
went much further. The criteria determining who may assert a plea
of estoppel were held to differ fundamentally from those determining
against whom the plea may be asserted. Due process forbids the asser-
tion of the plea against a party unless he was bound by the earlier liti-
gation; but no reason was discerned for requiring the party asserting
9 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 274 U.S. 464 (1918) ; RESTATEmENT, JuDG-
MENTS § 83, comment a at 389-90 (1942).10 Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Expr. Inc., 284 N.Y. 350, 31 N.E. 2d 188
(1940).
1 Good Health Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E. 2d 758 (1937);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 84, comment c at 393-96 (1942).
12 Elder v. New York & Pa. Motor Expr. Inc., supra note 10.
'13 Id. at 353, 31 N.E. 2d at 192.




the plea to have been bound by the prior litigation. To determine the
validity of the plea, the court suggested three pertinent questions:
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the
one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judg-
ment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is
asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudi-
cation ?"
Technically, this decision authorized either offensive or defensive use
of the plea of estoppel. The court stated:
Where a party though appearing in two suits in different capaci-
ties is in fact litigating the same right, the judgment in one estops
him in the other.'6
Although there was not an "offensive" use of the plea in this case,
some authorities have since interpreted the decision as allowing just such
a use.
1 7
The offensive plea of estoppel by a "stranger" in a subsequent suit
against a party or a privy to the original action has been slow to gain
acceptance."" In the main case, 19 special circumstances prompted the
court to overlook objections to a "stranger's" offensive use of the plea,
though it was conceded that such liberality has been criticized. The
court cites Professor Brainerd Currie's objection
... that the abandonment of the mutuality requirement is sound
except (1) "where the result would be to create an anomaly such
as would occur in the railroad type of situation where the party
against whom the plea is asserted faces more than two successive
actions," or (2) where "by reason of his former adversary's
possession of the initiative," he has not "had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue effectively." 20
But the court allowed the offensive use of the plea because
...Glidden's opportunity to litigate the Zdanok case was both
full and fair .... Although the plaintiffs ... could ... have sub-
jected Glidden to . . . a series of actions ... such a course offers
little advantage where the matter in issue is not a factual ques-
tion of negligence subject to the varying appraisals of the facts
by different juries, but the construction of a written contract by a
judge .... [N]othing... turned on personal sympathy or any
15 Id. at 812, 122 P. 2d at 895.
16 Id. at 813, 122 P. 2d at 896.
17 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., supra note 1, where Justice Friendly recognized such
an authorization; Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the
Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. Rzv. 281 (1957), where Professor Currie
also saw such an authorization.
8 Nevarrow v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P. 2d 111 (1958) ; Elder v.
New York & Pa. Motor Expr. Inc., supra note 10; Israel v. Wood Dolson
Co., 1 N.Y. 2d 116, 134 N.E. 2d 97 (1956); all of which limited the plea to a
defensive use.




other consideration relating specifically to those five plaintiffs as
distinguished from the other employees.
• ..Glidden cannot reasonably argue that it was unfairly sur-
prised by the entry of the Alexander plaintiffs .. . or that it
would have defended more diligently .... The Zdanok litigation
was prosecuted . . . up to the Supreme Court of the United
States .... The Alexander action... was mentioned in Glidden's
brief .... 
21
The Wisconsin courts appear to be advanced in their abandonment
of mutuality to permit broadened application of collateral estoppel. In
1956, the supreme court found reason to avoid the mutuality doctrine
where "countervailing reasons are present. 2 2 Where plaintiff had previ-
ously sued a liability insurer, grounding his action upon the insured's
negligence, subsequent relitigation of this issue against the insured was
barred, thus clearly recognizing the defensive use of the plea of estoppel
by a "straniger."
In 1962, the Seventh Circuit authorized the offensive use of estoppel
by a stranger in an action in tort tried under Wisconsin's comparative
negligence statute.23 The original action arose in a Wisconsin state
court out of an automobile accident, and only the drivers were parties.
The trial court apportioned their negligence 75%-25%. In a later action
brought by injured passengers, "strangers" to the first action, in the
federal court for Wisconsin's Eastern District, both drivers were held
to be estopped by the prior apportionment of their negligence, and the
only question left to be tried was the amount of the passengers' dam-
ages. This case and others2 4 also have shown that collateral estoppel
will apply, under principles analogous to those for establishing "full
faith and credit," so as to estop a party to prior litigation in another
jurisdiction from relitigating the same issues in a different jurisdiction.
Possibilities of future liberalization of collateral estoppel appear to
turn heavily upon proper appraisal of the concepts of "close relation"
and "countervailing equities." The principal case2s makes it apparent
that neither of the traditional requirements of "closeness"-identity or
conventional privity-any longer controls; nor is it of controlling sig-
nificance that a litigant seeking to reverse the earlier litigation of an
issue is prepared to offer new or more convincing evidence on retrial.
On the other hand, the cases appear to insist that the issues themselves
be strictly identical in the prior and subsequent litigations; that both
opportunity and motive for substantial contest of the issue in the prior
21 Ibid.
22 McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W. 2d 194 (1956); RSTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 96, comment a at 473-74 (1942).
23 Gorski v. Commercial Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 11 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
24 See also: Hudson v. Western Oil Fields Inc., 374 P. 2d 403 (Colo. 1962);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGM ENTS § 46, comment d at 180-81; id. § 68, comment v at
314-15 (1942).25 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., supra note 1.
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litigation be present; and that some awareness of the vulnerability to
the later claim have existed, by reason of the "close relation," when
the earlier litigation was being contested.
Liberalized application of collateral estoppel tends to alleviate the
need for compulsory counterclaim, joinder, and cross-claim statutes.
By one procedural avenue or another, therefore, the courts are moving
toward their objectives: the final disposition of complex controversies
in a single trial.
DENIS J. WAGNER
Criminal Law: Dismissal of Indictment Obtained in Violation
of Constitutional Rights: In Jones v. United States,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the conviction of defendant for robbery, holding that, where substantial
prejudice results, an indictment obtained in violation of federal con-
stitutional rights must be dismissed. The court saw "neither reason nor
authority"2 for distinguishing between unconstitutional composition
of a grand jury, which vitiated the indictment in Cassell v. Texas,3
and unconstitutional proceedings of a grand jury in Jones.
The court observed that defendant did not consent to being brought
before the grand jury and was taken there in handcuffs. No one in-
formed him prior to his appearance before the grand jury that he need
not testify if taken there, although police and the committing magistrate
told him in general terms that he need not incriminate himself. The
court also pointed out that when defendant actually faced the grand
jury, the warning the prosecutor gave him was inadequate to protect
his rights even if his presence had been voluntary. The prosecutor told
defendant that he need not answer questions and that his answers could
be used against him "at any future trial." However, defendant was not
informed that the grand jury might use his answers as a basis for in-
dicting him; nor was he told that he was entitled to consult counsel
before being questioned by the grand jury. In light of the fifth amend-
ment guarantee that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself," the court felt that the above pro-
cedure could not be justified.
In Counselnman v. Hitchcock4 the United States Supreme Court held
that a grand jury investigation of a crime is "a criminal case"5at which
incriminating questions need not be answered. In the Jones decision,
the court declared that implicit in the Supreme Court's action in Lawn
v. United States6 was the proposition that the taking of an accused
1 No. 17688, D.C. Cir., Feb. 6, 1964.
2Id. at 10.
3 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
4 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
5 Id. at 562.
6 335 U.S. 339 (1958).
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